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Abstract: The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Kadi1 is 
of defining constitutional importance. The Court understood the EU Treaties (at 
the time, the EC Treaty) as establishing their own constitutional space, asserted 
the autonomy of EU law vis-à-vis international law and held that responses to 
emergencies should be handled through, rather than outside, the bounds of the 
EU Treaties. The judgment is predicated on liberal democratic ideals and views 
respect for legality as a sine qua non in times of emergency. This chapter seeks to 
discuss selected case law developments after Kadi. It focuses on the effect of inva-
lidity of sanctions on third parties, issues pertaining to the validity and interpre-
tation of Council Regulation 881/2002/EC,2 economic sanctions against nuclear 
proliferation and corresponding developments in the case law of the UK Supreme 
Court. It does not deal exhaustively with post-Kadi case law.3 Section I provides 
a brief introduction to the judgment in Kadi. Section II explores the effect of the 
ruling on third parties. Section III discusses a selection of recent case law of the 
Court of Justice and the General Court, and section IV explores in some detail 
the judgment of the UK Supreme Court in Jabar Ahmed.4
1 Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v 
Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351 (‘Kadi’).
2 Council Regulation 881/2002/EC of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the 
Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban, [2002] OJ L139/9.
3 The chapter does not deal exhaustively with the case law of the General Court gener-
ated by sanctions lists introduced by the European Community and not by the Sanctions 
Committee of the UN. For these cases, see, among others, Case T-284/08 People’s 
Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council (OMPI III) [2008] ECR II-3487; Case T-256/07 
People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran v Council (OMPI II) [2008] ECR II-3019; Case 
T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council (OMPI I) [2006] ECR 
II-4665.
4 [2010] UKSC 2;[2010] 2 WLR 378.
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I. THE JUDGMENT IN KADI
IN KADI, THE Court of Justice was concerned with the validity of Regulation 881/2002/EC, by which the Council implemented United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1390 (2000) imposing 
economic sanctions on non-State actors associated with Osama Bin Laden 
and the Al-Qaeda network. The names of the persons included in the 
sanctions list were determined by the UN Sanctions Committee which had 
been set up under UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999). The basic findings of 
the Court may be summarised as follows. First, the Court held that the 
European Community (now Union) has competence to adopt economic 
sanctions against individuals on the basis of Articles 301, 60(1) and 308 of 
the EC Treaty5 (Articles 215, 75, 352 TFEU). Secondly, it held that meas-
ures adopted by the Community/Union institutions to give effect to UNSC 
resolutions are subject to review on grounds of respect for fundamental 
rights as protected by EU law. The Court adopted a dualist approach, hold-
ing that, whilst it does not have power to review the lawfulness of a UNSC 
resolution, it does have jurisdiction to review the compatibility of measures 
adopted by the Community institutions with the Treaty. Such review of an 
EU regulation implementing a UNSC resolution does not entail any chal-
lenge to the primacy of that resolution in international law.6 The Court 
upheld the paramountcy of fundamental rights, recalling its judgment in 
Les Verts and reiterating that neither the Member States nor the EU institu-
tions can avoid review of the conformity of their acts with the EC Treaty.7 
Thus, in the Court’s rationale, the primacy of the UN Charter takes place 
only in the sphere of international law. It does not penetrate the constitu-
tional space of the EU and, within that space, it cannot take precedence 
over the general principles of law of which fundamental rights form a part.8 
On that basis, the Court proceeded to annul Regulation 881/2002/EC, by 
which the assets of the applicants had been frozen, on the ground that the 
applicants’ right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right 
to property had been infringed. The applicants had not been informed of 
the evidence against them, no reasons had been given for the inclusion of 
their names in the sanctions list and they had not been afforded any oppor-
tunity to put their case.9
5 Arts 60(1) and 301 have now been replaced by Arts 75 and 215 TFEU respectively, which 
provide expressly for the imposition of sanctions against non-State actors. Art 308 has been 
replaced by Art 352 TFEU.
6 Kadi, above n 1, paras 287–88.
7 Case 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 23; Kadi, above n 1, para 
281.
8 Kadi, above n 1, para 308.
9 Ibid, paras 345ff.
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The judgment in Kadi has been the subject of extensive commentary.10 It 
suffices here to make some brief points. 
It may be said that the judgment carries a ‘disobedience value’. If the 
Court of Justice trumps the UNSC, what is there to prevent the courts of 
another country, perhaps one which shows much less respect for the values 
of human rights, from trumping UNSC resolutions for being incompatible 
with its own constitutional principles? Seen in that context, the judgment 
appears to contribute to the fragmentation of international law and under-
mine the authority of the Security Council.
It is correct that, if the Security Council is to fulfil its role as the ulti-
mate guarantor of world peace and security, UNSC resolutions must be 
complied with and enforced effectively at national level. Full and effec-
tive enforcement requires the support not only of the executive but of all 
branches of government. The judiciary should play its role by according 
due weight to decisions emanating from the Security Council. Respect for 
the Security Council, however, does not equate to government without 
law. Under Article 103 of the UN Charter, the primacy of the Charter and 
obligations arising under it apply in the sphere of international law. They 
do not interfere with the domestic law of the UN Member States, neither 
do they require those States to abrogate their own constitutional require-
ments. The classic argument of limited constitutional delegation applies 
here in full as it applies in the context of the EU: a national government 
cannot transfer to the UN more powers than it itself possesses under its 
national constitution. The ruling of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union can therefore be viewed as a procedural one: Member States may 
not use the European Community (now Union) to pursue political ends 
unless they observe the limitations imposed by the rule of law as they are 
articulated by the substantive rules and institutional arrangements estab-
lished by the Treaty. The risk of disobedience identified above is inherent 
in Article 103 of the UN Charter, which operates only in the sphere of 
international law and does not interfere with the internal legal systems 
of UN Member States. There is no evidence to suggest that the courts of 
10 The judgment has generated a huge bibliography. See, among others, G de Búrca, ‘The 
EU, the European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi’ (2009) 51 
Harvard International Law Journal, available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1321313>, 
accessed 30 July 2010; D Halberstam and E Stein, ‘The United Nations, the European Union, 
and the King of Sweden: Economic Sanctions and Individual Rights in a Plural World Order’ 
(2009) 46 CML Rev 13, available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1312082>, accessed 
30 July 2010; see the contributions in the symposium on the Kadi judgment (2009) 28 YEL 
531–700; JE Khushal Murkens, ‘Countering Anti-Constitutional Argument: The Reasons for 
the European Court of Justice’s Decision in Kadi and Al Barakaat’ (2008–2009) 11 CYELS 
15; T Tridimas and JA Gutierrez-Fons, ‘EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions 
against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress?’ (2009) 32 Fordham Journal of International 
Law 660; T Tridimas, ‘Terrorism and the ECJ: Empowerment and Democracy in the EC Legal 
Order’ (2009) 34 EL Rev 103–26.
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third countries will disrespect the UNSC because of the Court of Justice’s 
judgment. The risk of fragmentation is also inevitable given the growing 
presence and significance of international law.11 It is the quid pro quo for 
the transfer of more powers to international organisations. By demanding 
higher standards of human rights, the Court of Justice in fact contributes 
to the democratisation and legitimacy of international law. The judgment 
marks the initiation of a constitutional conversation with the UN. In this 
respect, the Court of Justice should respond positively to the establishment 
of higher standards of justice by UN agencies. The higher the protection of 
human rights offered by them, the greater the deference which the Court of 
Justice should accord them.
It has been argued that, by asserting the primacy of EU human rights over 
the edicts of the UN, the Court of Justice is behaving towards the Security 
Council in the way that the German and Italian Constitutional Courts 
behaved towards it in the aftermath of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft.12 
There is some truth in this observation. It is correct to say that judicial 
bodies feel very protective of their own jurisdiction. Just as national con-
stitutional courts consider themselves the guardians of their constitutions, 
so the Court of Justice sees its task as safeguarding what it perceives to be 
the integrity and the values of the EU legal order. There does not appear 
to be, however, any inconsistency on the part of the Court of Justice. In 
its case law, it offered a set of endogenous standards for the protection of 
fundamental rights as a quid pro quo for asserting the primacy of EU law. 
No such set of standards appears to exist as yet at UN level.
Kadi must be viewed, first and foremost, as a statement of principle. It 
marks the beginning and not the end of the enquiry. The Court of Justice 
annulled the contested Regulation on grounds of procedure and not on 
grounds of substance. It preserved the effects of the Regulation for a limited 
time, thus giving the opportunity to the Council to comply with process 
rights. Lastly, the judgment tells us little about the way the Court of Justice 
would balance the need for public security and the prevention of terrorism, 
on the one hand, and the protection of the rights of the individual, on the 
other hand. In the circumstances of the case, there was no statement of 
reasons and a complete absence of the rights of defence. Kadi confirms that 
11 See, in this context, the work of the International Law Commission on ‘Fragmentation 
of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international 
law’, available at <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_9.htm>, accessed 30 July 2010. 
Contributions on the subject are numerous. For a concise account, see the conclusions of 
the ILC’s study group submitted to the UN General Assembly, available at <http://untreaty.
un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1_9_2006.pdf>, accessed 30 July 2010, 
and G Hafner, ‘Pros and Cons Ensuing from the Fragmentation of International Law’ (2004) 
25 Michigan Journal of International Law 849.
12 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle Getreide 
[1970] ECR 1125.
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the executive enjoys no immunity, but it does not tell us by what standards 
it will be held accountable.13
II. EFFECT OF THE KADI RULING ON THIRD PARTIES
A. The position of other persons included in the sanctions list
In Kadi, the Court of Justice annulled Regulation 881/2002/EC only insofar 
as it concerned the applicants.14 What is the effect of the ruling on other 
persons listed in Regulation 881/2002/EC? It seems clear that such persons 
would not be able to challenge the Regulation directly since, by the time the 
ruling was delivered, they had missed the two-month time limit provided 
in Article 263(6) TFEU (ex Article 230(5) EC). Under Article 266 TFEU 
(ex Article 233 EC), following the ruling in Kadi, the Council is under an 
obligation to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment.15 
According to AssiDöman, however, this does not require the Council to re-
examine identical or similar decisions allegedly affected by the same irregu-
larity addressed to other persons.16 Although Regulation 881/2002/EC is a 
measure of general application, the entries of persons in the sanctions list 
are in effect individual acts to which the rationale of AssiDöman appears 
to apply by analogy.
Another possibility for a listed person might be to seek to challenge 
Regulation 881/2002/EC indirectly via the preliminary reference procedure. 
This, however, appears to be precluded by the TWD principle.17 This posits 
that a person who clearly has direct and individual concern to challenge an 
13 For a more detailed discussion of process rights, see the judgments of the General Court 
in the OMPI cases referred to above n 3.
14 One may presume that the other persons included in the list were in the same position 
as Mr Kadi and Al Barakaat, namely that their fundamental rights had also been infringed. It 
is clear, however, that the Court could not have extended the scope of its ruling beyond the 
applicants. Mr Kadi and Al Barakaat had locus standi to challenge the regulation only insofar 
as it related to them. Any attempt to launch a more general attack would have stumbled upon 
the lack of direct and individual concern. Furthermore, the Court could adjudicate only within 
the limits of the action brought by the parties and did not have jurisdiction to rule ultra petita: 
see Case C-310/97 Commission v AssiDöman Kraft Products AB and others (Woodpulp III) 
[1999] ECR I-5363. Neither would it be possible for the Court to rule on whether the process 
rights of other listed persons had been breached without hearing any evidence in relation to 
them. 
15 As stated above, the Court of Justice decided to maintain the effects of the Regulation 
temporarily in force and gave the Council three months to comply with the process rights of 
the applicants. See Kadi, above n 1, paras 373–76. Following the judgment, the Commission, 
by Regulation 1190/2008/EC, [2008] OJ L322/25, re-included Mr Kadi in the sanctions list. 
This Regulation has been challenged before the CFI (now the General Court), inter alia, on 
the ground that it suffers from the same procedural irregularities as Regulation 881/2002/EC: 
see Case T-85/09 Kadi v Commission, introduced on 26 February 2009.
16 AssiDöman, above n 14, para 56. 
17 Case C-188/92 TWD v Germany [1994] ECR I-833.
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EU measure directly, and who has failed to do so within the requisite time 
limit, may not mount a collateral challenge via the preliminary reference 
procedure. Although the TWD judgment has so far been applied only to 
decisions18 and anti-dumping regulations,19 and not to other regulations 
or directives,20 it is arguable that it applies to Regulation 881/2002/EC 
since, in the circumstances, it was beyond doubt that the applicants had 
locus standi. The application of TWD to economic sanctions measures is 
confirmed by the judgment in E & F, which is examined in detail below.21 
Suffice it to state here that, based on the existing authorities, the avenue 
of indirect challenge before a national court does not seem open to other 
listed persons whose standing to challenge directly their inclusion in the list 
is not in doubt.22
It could be argued that an entity whose assets were frozen by Regulation 
881/2002/EC could invite the Council to review its position in the light of 
the judgment in Kadi. If the Council refused, it could then challenge the 
Council’s refusal under Article 263 TFEU (Article 230 EC) or, if the Council 
remained silent, bring an action for failure to act under Article 265 TFEU 
(Article 232 EC). This route, however, would be unlikely to bear fruit. 
The Council’s refusal to re-examine the case would not be a new act but 
simply an act confirming the legal position of the listed person under the 
Regulation, and would thus not be open to challenge. An action for failure 
to act would also fail, since the Council could define its position under 
Article 265 TFEU (Article 232 EC) by adopting a confirmatory decision, 
which would not be open to review.
If the above analysis is correct, it would mean that the judgment in 
Kadi has little effect on other persons listed by Regulation 881/2002/EC. 
The only possibility for such a person might be to bring an action in 
damages against the Council, but this would be subject to proving the 
existence of a serious breach; and in any event, it could not lead to release 
18 See, eg Case C-178/95 Wiljo NV v Belgian State [1997] ECR I-585. 
19 Case C-239/99 Nachi Europe GmbH v Hauptzollamt Krefeld [2001] ECR I-01197.
20 See Case C-241/95 The Queen v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce ex parte 
Accrington Beef and Others [1996] ECR I-6699; Case C-408/95 Eurotunnel SA v SeaFrance 
[1997] ECR I-6315.
21 See section II.B. below.
22 By contrast, it appears that a third party which is adversely affected by the Regulation 
may challenge its validity via the preliminary reference procedure insofar as it has an interest in 
the outcome of the proceedings. This derives from the nature of Regulation 881/2002/EC as a 
measure of general application. In Kadi, above n 1, paras 241ff, the Court of Justice confirmed 
that although listed persons have direct and individual concern, since they are expressly named 
in the Annex to the Regulation, that does not detract from its character as a true regulation: it 
prohibits anyone from making available funds or economic resources to the listed persons, and 
is thus addressed in a general and abstract manner to all persons who might hold the funds in 
question. See also Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council 
and Commission [2005] ECR II-3533, paras 186–88.
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of the frozen funds, neither could it serve as the basis for a restitutionary 
claim.23
At first sight, it seems harsh that a listed person cannot require the Council 
to review his position in the light of the Kadi judgment. The justification 
for this strict approach is to be found in the principle of legal certainty. As 
the Court held in TWD and AssiDöman, a measure which has not been 
challenged by the addressee within the time limit laid down in Article 263 
TFEU (ex Article 230 EC) becomes definitive as against him.24 The require-
ments of the rule of law are satisfied insofar as citizens are guaranteed the 
opportunity to mount a challenge. Where such an opportunity clearly exists 
and standing to apply for judicial review is not in question, the right to 
judicial protection is respected and the formalism of TWD is justified by the 
principles of legal certainty, good administration of justice and procedural 
economy.25
It could be argued that TWD does not apply to an EU measure: 
a)  which in the light of a subsequent judgment of the Court of Justice 
has proved to violate basic fundamental rights; 
b) which causes substantial injustice; and 
c)  about which the person concerned has complained immediately after 
becoming aware of the judgment of the Court. 
It is an open question whether the Court of Justice might be prepared to 
accept such an exception. In any event, the harsh effects of TWD are allevi-
ated by two factors. First, as will be argued below,26 TWD does not apply 
to criminal proceedings. Secondly, its effects are lessened where economic 
sanctions are limited in time. Thus, where the EU measure imposing the 
sanctions requires the Council to review the list at regular intervals, the 
Council will be under an obligation to honour the process rights established 
in Kadi when it renews the list. Where the freezing of funds is of indefi-
nite duration, the issue arises whether the permanency of the sanctions 
may itself be contrary to Article 6 ECHR. It is submitted that there would 
indeed be a breach of Article 6, and possibly also of Article 8, insofar as a 
listed person was denied the opportunity to plead that circumstances have 
23 The case law states that a party may not, by means of an action for damages, circum-
vent the inadmissibility of an application for annulment which concerns the same instance of 
illegality and has the same financial end in view: see, eg, AssiDöman, above n 14, para 62; 
Joined Cases C-199 and C-200/94 P Pevasa and Impesca v Commission [1995] ECR I-3709. 
It would thus not be possible for a listed person to obtain release of his funds or compensa-
tion equal to the amount of the funds frozen by means of an action in damages, although he 
could obtain compensation for any damage arising as a result of the freezing of his assets. For 
the chances of success of an action in damages, see T Tridimas and JA Gutierrez-Fons, above 
n 10, at 702ff.
24 See TWD, above n 17, para 13; AssiDöman, above n 14, para 57. 
25 See AssiDöman, above n 14, para 61.
26 See section II.C. below.
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changed and that they thus no longer warrant his inclusion in the list. The 
indefinite duration of a freezing order appears contrary to the principle 
of proportionality which is embodied in Articles 6 and 8 ECHR. Support 
for this view may also be found in the judgment in HM Treasury v Jabar 
Ahmed,27 where the UK Supreme Court viewed the permanent character 
of the sanctions in issue as one of the reasons which made it incompatible 
with fundamental rights. It is thus submitted that, where an EU sanctions 
regime is of indefinite duration, a listed entity has the right to request the 
Council to revisit its position, and may challenge the Council’s refusal to 
do so under Articles 263 and 265 TFEU (ex Articles 230 and 232 EC, 
respectively).
B. Effect on third parties: The E & F case
So far, we have examined the effects of Kadi on other persons listed in 
Regulation 881/2002/EC. There is, however, a wider issue: what are the 
effects of the illegality of sanctions on third parties? The Court had the 
opportunity to examine this issue in E & F.28 The defendants in the main 
proceedings were members of an organisation known as DHKP-C, whose 
funds had been frozen pursuant to Council Regulation 2580/2001/EC.29 
That Regulation had been adopted to give effect to UNSC Resolution 1373 
(2001) and CFSP Common Position 2001/931.30 Article 2 of Regulation 
2580/2001/EC provides for the freezing of funds of the persons included 
in a sanctions list which is to be determined by a Council decision. It 
also prohibits making available funds or other financial resources for the 
benefit of a person included in the list. DHKP-C was first included in 
the sanctions list by Council Decision 2002/334/EC.31 Its inclusion was 
maintained for the years 2002 to 2008 by successive Council decisions 
updating the list. 
E and F were charged with being members of DHKP-C, organising fund-
raising campaigns for its benefit and transferring funds to it. The charges 
were based on paragraph 34(4) of the German Law on Foreign Trade, which 
makes infringement of EU legislative acts such as Regulation 2580/2001/EC 
punishable by criminal penalties. The criminal court hearing the case was 
uncertain as to the legality of the criminal charges. Its doubts were based 
27 Above, n 4. See, eg, paras 5 and 39 per Lord Hope. See also R(M) v HM Treasury [2008] 
2 All ER 1097.
28 Case C-550/09 E and F, judgment of 29 June 2010, nyr.
29 [2001] OJ L344/70.
30 [2001] OJ L344/93.
31  [2002] OJ L116/33.
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on the judgments of the General Court in OMPI I and related cases32 where 
the General Court had annulled Council decisions implementing Regulation 
2580/2001/EC for breach of process rights, including the requirement to 
state reasons. In the light of those judgments, the criminal court doubted 
whether the inclusion of DHKP-C in the sanctions list was legal, since the 
Council had failed to state reasons for the listing of the various persons con-
tained in the sanction list. It was, however, uncertain whether the Council 
decisions could be declared illegal insofar as they placed and subsequently 
maintained DHKP-C on the list, given that DHKP-C had not itself sought 
annulment of its inclusion in the list.
There was an additional complication in the case. Following the judgment 
of the General Court in OMPI I, the Council (by Decision 2007/445/EC33) 
had maintained DHKP-C’s name in the list, but this time it sought to pro-
vide reasons for doing so. The referring court was uncertain as to whether 
Decision 2007/445/EC might have legitimated ex post facto the inclusion of 
DHKP-C in the list for the period prior to 29 June 2007 when it took effect. 
There were therefore two separate issues before the Court of Justice: first, 
whether the validity of DHKP-C’s listing could be contested in the context of 
the criminal proceedings against E and F despite the fact that DHKP-C had 
not brought direct proceedings in time; and, secondly, whether a Council 
decision providing reasons for the inclusion of an organisation in the sanc-
tion list may legitimate ex post facto the organisation’s inclusion in the list 
for past periods of time. Each of those issues will be examined in turn.
On the first issue, the Court of Justice held that the Council decisions 
implementing Regulation 2580/2001/EC could be held illegal insofar as 
they included DHKP-C in the sanctions list. It reasoned as follows: reaf-
firming TWD, it held that the right to challenge the validity of an EU 
measure via the preliminary reference procedure presupposes that the party 
in question had no right of direct action.34 It then went on to determine 
whether, if the defendants had brought an action for annulment of that list-
ing, the admissibility of their action would have been beyond doubt, and 
came to a negative conclusion.35 It was not the defendants themselves but 
DHKP-C which had been placed on the sanctions list. Further, there was 
no information on the basis of which it could be established that the posi-
tion occupied by the defendants within DHKP-C would have conferred on 
them the power to represent that organisation in an action for annulment. 
Lastly, it could not be held that the defendants were indisputably directly 
32 See Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du people d’Iran v Council, [2006] 
ECR II-4665 (OMPI I); Case T-253/04 KONGRA-GEL [2008] ECR II46; Case T-229/02 
Osman Ocalan on behalf of PKK v Council [2008] ECR II-45; Case T-327/03 Stichting Al-
Aqsa v Council [2007] ECR II-79; and Case T-47/03 Sison v Council [2007] ECR II-79.
33 [2007] OJ L169/58.
34 E and F, above n 28, para 46.
35 Ibid, paras 49–50.
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and individually concerned by the listing of DHKP-C.36 It followed that, in 
contrast to DHKP-C, the defendants did not have an indisputable right to 
bring a direct action for annulment.37
Having established that the legality of the DHKP-C’s inclusion in the list 
could be challenged, the Court of Justice went on to find that the duty to state 
reasons had been violated, because none of the successive Council decisions 
listing DHKP-C had been accompanied by a statement of reasons. As a result 
of the lack of reasoning, the defendants had been denied the information 
necessary to enable them to verify whether the inclusion of DHKP-C on the 
list was well-founded. They therefore did not have the opportunity to contest 
the accuracy and relevance of the evidence on which the listing was based, 
although it was one of the bases of the charges brought against them.38
Turning to the issue of retroactivity, the Court rejected the argument 
that the adoption of Decision 2007/445/EC could legitimate ex post facto 
the inclusion of DHKP-C on the list prior to the date when that decision 
was adopted.39 It is difficult to see how the Court could have reached any 
other conclusion. If Decision 2007/445/EC could remedy retroactively the 
lack of reasoning in the previous decisions listing DHKP-C, it would form 
the basis for a criminal conviction in respect of acts committed before its 
adoption and thus run counter to the prohibition on retroactive application 
of criminal law. As the Court and the Advocate-General pointed out, that 
prohibition applies not only to provisions which criminalise conduct, but to 
all provisions which form the basis for a criminal conviction.40
36 Ibid, para 51. This is because inclusion in the sanctions list, as provided by Regulation 
2580/2001/EC, is of general application. It serves, together with that regulation, to impose on 
an indeterminate number of persons an obligation to comply with specific restrictive measures 
against DHKP-C.
37 Ibid, para 52. 
38 Ibid, para 56.
39 Note that the questions referred concerned only the legality of the listing of DHKP-C by 
successive Council decisions until the entry into force of Decision 2007/445/EC. By contrast, 
the legality of the latter decision and subsequent decisions by which DHKP-C was maintained 
in the list was not in issue in the proceedings. The Court therefore did not have the opportunity 
to consider whether the statement of reasons for the listing of DHKP-C provided in Decision 
2007/445/EC was adequate.
40 E and F, above n 28, para 59; Opinion of A-G Mengozzi of 17 May 2010 in that case, 
para 117. See, for previous case law, Case 63/83 Kirk [1984] ECR 2689, paras 21 and 22; 
Case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others [1990] ECR I-4023, para 44; and Joined Cases C-387/02, 
C-391/02 and C-403/02 Berlusconi and Others [2005] ECR I-3565, paras 74–78. Note, how-
ever, that Decision 2007/445/EC could have retroactive effect outside the sphere of criminal law. 
As the General Court pointed out in Case T-256/07 People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran v 
Council (OMPI II) [2008] ECR II-3019, para 65, when a measure has been annulled for proce-
dural defects, the institution concerned is entitled to adopt afresh an identical measure, this time 
observing the formal and procedural rules in question, and even to give that measure retroactive 
effect, if that is essential to the attainment of the public interest objective pursued and if the 
legitimate expectations of the persons concerned are duly protected. Thus, where the inclusion 
of a person in the sanctions list is annulled for procedural errors, the Council has the power to 
adopt a new decision with retroactive effect reinstating the person concerned in the list.
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An interesting aspect of the case relates to the invocability of the grounds 
of annulment. The Commission and the prosecutor had submitted that the 
defendants could not invoke the breach of DHKP-C’s procedural rights. 
Advocate-General Mengozzi rejected that argument, inter alia on the ground 
that, under the case law, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give rul-
ings on the validity of EU acts cannot be limited by the grounds on which 
their validity is contested.41 Also, if that argument were accepted, it would 
result in denying the right which defendants generally possess to contest the 
legality of acts on which the charges against them are based.42 Furthermore, 
in the context of a preliminary reference, it is for the referring court to 
decide whether to pose a question on the validity of an EU act and the pos-
sible grounds of invalidity.43
In the circumstances of the case, the Court’s approach was correct. It is 
clear that the lack of reasoning had a direct impact upon the defendants, 
since one of the bases of the criminal charges against them was that DHKP-C 
was a listed organisation. The absence of reasons, therefore, denied them 
the information necessary to enable them to verify whether the inclusion of 
DHKP-C on the list was well-founded. The judgment, however, does not 
necessarily stand as a general pronouncement that, where the validity of an 
EU measure is challenged indirectly in national proceedings, a party may 
invoke the breach of process rights of the persons to whom that measure 
is addressed. It is uncertain, for example, whether interested parties could 
invoke the breach of the right to a hearing of the persons included in the 
list. The requirement to give reasons receives preferential treatment because 
it has a strong public law rationale. According to standard case law, one of 
the objectives of the requirement to give reasons is to enable the Court to 
exercise its power of review.44 This explains why the Court is more willing 
to examine of its own motion whether the statement of reasons of a measure 
are adequate45 than whether the rights of defence have been respected.46
41 See Opinion of A-G Mengozzi of 17 May 2010 in Case C-550/09 E and F, above n 28, 
para 96.
42 Ibid, para 97.
43 Ibid, para 98.
44 Its other objectives being to give an opportunity to the parties involved of defending 
their rights, and to third persons of ascertaining the circumstances in which the institution 
concerned applied the Treaty: see, eg, Case 24/62 Germany v Commission [1963] ECR 63, 69; 
Case 294/81 Control Data v Commission [1983] ECR 911, para 14; Joined Cases T-79/89, etc 
BASF AG and Others v Commission [1992] ECR II-315, para 66.
45 Case 18/57 Nold v High Authority [1959] ECR 41; Case 185/85 Usinor v Commission 
[1986] ECR 2079, para 19; Case C-166/95 P Commission v Daffix [1997] ECR I-983, para 24. 
The Community judicature is, however, not under a duty to raise the issue on its own motion in all 
cases and, depending on the circumstances, it may reject as inadmissible a plea that the contested 
act is insufficiently reasoned if it is not submitted in time: Case T-106/95 Fédération Française des 
Sociétés d’Assurances (FFSA) and Others v Commission [1997] ECR II-229, para 62.
46 See, eg, Case T-106/95 Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurances (FFSA) and 
Others v Commission [1997] ECR II-229, paras 48–49; Case T-16/91 Rendo and Others v 
Commission [1992] ECR II-2417, para 131. 
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Advocate-General Mengozzi appeared to accept that the Court of Justice 
could review the decision on any grounds, thus suggesting that review has 
a universal character. A more nuanced approach would suggest that it is 
necessary to establish in each case whether the rule or principle of EU law 
breach of which is claimed before the national court confers rights on the 
party who seeks to invoke it. This may be viewed as an issue of standing 
to be decided under national law, or as an attribute of the EU principle or 
rule breach of which is claimed, which is to be determined by EU law. It is 
submitted that, in general, it is best viewed as such an attribute. The answer 
to the question depends upon two considerations. First, there are the objec-
tives and scope of the process rights infringement of which is claimed: can 
it be said that those rights are intended to protect the rights of third par-
ties, or do they protect only the rights of the addressee? Secondly, practical 
considerations must also be taken into account. Depending upon the rights 
in issue, it may not be possible for the Court to decide whether the process 
rights of the addressee have been breached in litigation where the addressee 
itself is not represented. Where this is not an issue, the importance of the 
rule that has been breached may also be a relevant consideration. Thus, 
the Court may be tempted to take the view that fundamental rights have a 
universal application, in that they can be invoked by any party whose legal 
position is adversely affected as a result of their breach.
C. Indirect challenge in criminal proceedings
A wider issue which arises in this context is whether TWD applies to crimi-
nal proceedings. Is a person subject to a criminal charge precluded from 
contesting the legality of an EU measure which forms the basis of the charge 
if he failed to challenge it directly? This is of some practical importance. The 
Treaty of Lisbon increases the presence of the EU in the sphere of criminal 
law, and thus makes it more likely that EU measures will be used to found 
national criminal legislation. In most cases, the charges will originate in a 
measure of general application in relation to which the standing of indi-
viduals is uncertain, so that TWD will be no obstacle. As E & F illustrates, 
however, it is not inconceivable that a measure in relation to which standing 
can easily be established may also be the basis for criminal proceedings.
In E & F, the Court reiterated the application of TWD as a general rule 
and found that it did not apply, not because of the criminal nature of the 
proceedings but because it had not been established beyond doubt that the 
defendants had standing to mount a direct challenge. The Court expressly 
stated that DHKP-C had an indisputable right to bring a direct action for 
the annulment of its listing.47 The implication may thus be drawn that, had 
47 E and F, above n 28, para 52. 
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a person included in the sanctions list sought to challenge its inclusion 
indirectly, it would have run into the TWD barrier, irrespective of the 
nature of the proceedings in the context of which the challenge was made. 
The case remains, however, that the Court of Justice did not examine this 
aspect specifically. The fact that it could have used the criminal nature of 
the proceedings to exclude the application of TWD does not equate with 
a finding that TWD applies to such proceedings, especially since the ques-
tions referred did not directly raise that issue.
There are powerful arguments against the application of TWD in 
criminal proceedings. The underlying premise of that principle is that the 
right to judicial protection is not without limits, and that legal certainty 
and finality, as expressed in the existence of time limits, are also pivotal 
aspects of the rule of law. Thus, although procedural exclusivity may in 
some cases have harsh consequences, overall these are outweighed by the 
advantages of legal certainty, the finality of disputes, and the integrity 
and stability of the legal system. This cost-effectiveness balance, how-
ever, changes where criminal charges are put into the mix. In such a case, 
the scales tip in favour of judicial protection. Indeed, Advocate-General 
Mengozzi expressed strong doubts about the applicability of TWD in 
criminal proceedings. He opined that legal certainty is not an absolute 
requirement and should not take precedence over the right of citizens to 
defend themselves in criminal proceedings by contesting the legality of the 
provisions on which the charges are based, especially where such provi-
sions run counter to fundamental rights.48 It is submitted that the exten-
sion of TWD to criminal proceedings would undermine the commitment 
of the EU legal order to fundamental rights and may also run counter to 
Article 6 ECHR.49
48 See Opinion of A-G Mengozzi, ibid, paras 86–87. 
49 The case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) does not appear to have 
dealt specifically with this issue. More generally, it accepts that reasonable limitation periods 
in civil proceedings serve legal certainty and finality, and are compatible with Art 6 ECHR, 
although an unduly short limitation period may give rise to a violation: see, eg, Perez de Rada 
Cavanilles v Spain (1998) 29 EHRR 109; Dobbie v United Kingdom, App no 28477/95, noted 
[1997] EHRLR 166. The case law has also accepted that although Art 6 ECHR does not guar-
antee a right of access to a court with power to invalidate or override a legislative measure, it 
does require that where a measure, albeit not formally addressed to an individual, affects his 
civil rights or obligations, whether by reason of certain attributes peculiar to him or by reason 
of a factual situation which differentiates him from all other persons, Art 6(1) may require that 
the substance of that measure is capable of being challenged before a court or tribunal: Posti 
and Rahko v Finland, App no 27824/95 (2003) 37 EHRR 6, judgment of 24 September 2002, 
para 53. These authorities are not of direct relevance to the situation under examination. It is 
submitted that the extension of TWD to criminal proceedings may well be viewed as a restric-
tion of the right of access to court which is disproportionate and runs counter to the right to 
equality of arms, since the defendant is deprived of the opportunity to dispute the evidence and 
the grounds raised against him. It may also be a violation of the right to non-discrimination 
provided in Art 14 ECHR.
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The extension of TWD to criminal proceedings would also be liable to 
interfere with rules of national law which determine which matters a crimi-
nal court may raise on its own motion. This was clearly not the intention 
of TWD.  The Court of Justice itself has accepted that TWD  does not apply 
where a question pertaining to the validity of an EU measure is referred 
not at the request of the individual who had the opportunity to bring direct 
proceedings, but by the referring court on its own motion. Although the 
precise scope of this ruling is uncertain, it does indicate that TWD is by no 
means an absolute principle.50
Furthermore, a distinction can be drawn in this context between the 
validity of an EU act and the consequences of its illegality in the national 
legal order. Where a criminal charge is brought on the basis of an EU mea-
sure, the criminal character of the conduct in question results from, and is 
an attribute of, national law. It is thus also for national law to decide in 
what circumstances the criminal character of the conduct in question may 
be lifted. Although it may not be open for a defendant to question indirectly 
the validity of an act which he had the opportunity to challenge directly, it 
should still be possible for the national court to seek a determination of the 
issue whether the act is vitiated by illegality, and to draw consequences from 
such a finding with regard to the criminal liability of the defendant. 51
Lastly, national laws appear to accept that, as a general rule, collateral 
challenge may take place in criminal proceedings. Thus, in English law, it is 
accepted that, in principle, an individual must be allowed to rely by way of 
defence in criminal proceedings on the invalidity of the administrative act 
on which the charges against him are based.52 Similarly, Greek law accepts 
as a general principle that criminal courts have jurisdiction to carry out a 
50
 Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze [2006] ECR I-289, paras 7273. 
51
 This is borne out by the judgment in E and F, itself, where the Court of Justice did not 
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review of the legality of the measure on which the charges are based,53 and 
are in fact required to do so where an objection of illegality is raised.54
III. VALIDITY AND INTERPRETATION OF REGULATION 881/2002/EC
A. Issues of validity
The judgment in Kadi was followed by the judgments of the CFI (now the 
General Court) in Othman55 and of the Court of Justice itself in Hassan 
and Ayadi.56 Both cases related to sanctions lists prescribed by the UN 
Sanctions Committee and implemented by Regulation 881/2002/EC.57 In 
Othman,58 the applicant had initiated proceedings in 2001, but they were 
suspended pending the outcome of the judgment in Kadi. Upon resump-
tion of the proceedings, the General Court found for the applicant. Given 
the judgment of the Court of Justice in Kadi, it is not possible to see how 
the General Court could have reached any other conclusion. The judgment 
of the General Court was different, however, in one respect. The General 
Court denied the Council’s request to maintain temporarily the effects of 
the contested Regulation. It did so on two grounds.59 First, it held that the 
period that had already elapsed since the delivery of the Court of Justice’s 
judgment in Kadi far exceeded the maximum period of three months 
allowed by the Court of Justice in that case to enable the Council to remedy 
the breach of process rights. Since the applicant’s situation was comparable 
to those of the appellants in Kadi, the Council could not have been unaware 
that it should have taken the same steps in relation to the applicant as those 
required in Kadi. 
The General Court gave a second reason which made it inappropriate to 
preserve the effects of the contested Regulation. It pointed out a difference 
between a Court of Justice judgment and a General Court judgment. Under 
Article 60 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, General Court rulings 
declaring a regulation to be void take effect only from the date of expiry of 
53 See Judgment of the Greek Court of Cassation No 782/79.
54 Art 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also provides that a judgment of a civil court 
on an issue which relates to a criminal trial does not bind the criminal court and is assessed 
independently at its discretion. This applies by analogy also to administrative law issues which 
are relevant to a criminal trial, although a criminal court is bound by a ruling of an admin-
istrative court declaring an administrative act invalid. See further E Spiliotopoulos, Elements 
of Greek Administrative Law, 9th edn (Athens, Sakkoulas, 1999) 115; A Karras, Criminal 
Procedure, 2nd edn (Athens, Sakkoulas, 1998) 113ff.
55 Case T-318/01 Othman v Council [2009] ECR II-1627.
56 Joined Cases C-399 and C-403/06 P Hassan and Ayadi v Council and Commission, judg-
ment of 3 December 2009, nyr.
57 Above n 2.
58 Above n 55.
59 Ibid, paras 97–98.
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the two-month period allowed for appeal to the Court of Justice or, if an 
appeal has been brought, as from the date of dismissal of the appeal. Thus, 
in any event, in addition to the time elapsed since the delivery of the Court 
of Justice’s judgment in Kadi, the Council had had an additional period of 
at least two months in order to remedy the infringements found.
The General Court’s approach suggests that the power to maintain in 
force the effects of a measure vitiated by illegality is to be used sparingly. 
It is, after all, an exceptional power, which allows an illegal measure to 
produce effects on a temporary basis in order to satisfy a higher interest 
of justice. One may have some sympathy with the Council’s position in 
Kadi, since the sanctions lists originated from the UN and it would not be 
possible for the Council to adduce any evidence or provide a statement of 
reasons to the applicant without first referring the matter to the Sanctions 
Committee, which the Council appears to have done.60 Nevertheless, the 
obligation to comply with process rights cannot be viewed merely as a ‘best 
efforts’ obligation. It is an absolute one. Otherwise, one would run the risk 
of nullifying the substantive findings of the judgment by delaying compli-
ance with the ruling for an indefinite period of time. Compliance with the 
judgments of the Court of Justice cannot be at the discretion of a third 
party—in this case, the UN Sanctions Committee.
In Hassan and Ayadi,61 the applicants’ assets had been frozen by 
Regulation 881/2002/EC. Their actions for annulment pre-dated the 
Court of Justice’s judgment in Kadi. At first instance,62 the General Court 
rejected their actions on the basis of reasoning similar to that in its judg-
ment in Kadi.63 When the applicants appealed against the General Court 
judgment, the case raised an interesting issue of procedure. Following 
the judgment of the Court of Justice in Kadi, the Commission adopted 
Regulation 954/2009/EC,64 which amended Regulation 881/2002/EC, and 
decided, after hearing the applicants, to include them again in the sanc-
tions list with retroactive effect. The question therefore arose whether, in 
view of the withdrawal of Regulation 881/2002/EC and its retroactive 
replacement by Regulation 954/2009/EC, it was still necessary to rule on 
the appeal.
60 Ibid, paras 72 and 73.
61 Above n 56.
62 Case T-40/04 Hassan v Council and Commission [2006] ECR II-52; Case T-253/02 Ayadi v 
Council [2006] ECR II-2139.
63 The General Court held that, since the sanctions list originated in UNSC resolutions, the 
General Court did not have jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of Regulation 881/2002/
EC with fundamental rights as they are protected in the EU legal order but only as they are 
recognised under jus cogens, and that, in the circumstances, the requirements of jus cogens 
had been met.
64 [2009] OJ L269/20.
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The Court of Justice answered in the affirmative. It held that the adoption 
of Regulation 954/2009/EC could not be regarded as equivalent to 
annulment ‘pure and simple’ of Regulation 881/2002/EC.65 Regulation 
954/2009/EC had kept the names of the appellants in the sanctions list with 
retroactive force, so that their assets continued to be frozen for the period 
for which Regulation 881/2002/EC was applicable, although the purpose 
of their actions was precisely to have their names removed from the sanc-
tions list. The adoption of Regulation 954/2009/EC could not, therefore, 
be considered to be a fact occurring after the judgments under appeal and 
capable of rendering the appeals devoid of purpose.66 The Court further 
observed that Regulation 954/2009/EC was not yet definitive, in that it 
could be the subject of an action for annulment. It therefore remained pos-
sible that Regulation 881/2002/EC might come back into force in relation 
to the appellants in the event that Regulation 954/2009/EC was successfully 
challenged.67
On the substance, the Court of Justice allowed the appeal, on the ground 
that the General Court’s reasoning was marred by the same errors in law 
as those of its judgment in Kadi, and it proceeded to annul Regulation 
881/2002/EC insofar as it applied to the appellants. In this case, the Court 
of Justice did not need to maintain the effects of the regulation in force since 
it had already been replaced by Regulation 954/2009/EC. 
B. Issues of interpretation
Whilst Kadi, Othman and Hassan questioned the validity of Regulation 
881/2002/EC, M v HM Treasury gave rise to issues pertaining to its inter-
pretation.68 The Court was called upon to interpret Article 2(2) of the 
Regulation, which states as follows: 
No funds shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of, 
a natural or legal person, group or entity designated by the Sanctions Committee 
and listed in Annex I. 
Article 2a of the Regulation, which was added to give effect to UNSC 
Resolution 1452 (2002), provides for an exception to the effect that the 
prohibition of Article 2(2) does not apply to funds which the competent 
65 Hassan and Ayadi, above n 56, para 61.
66 Ibid, para 62.
67 Ibid, para 63. On that ground, the Court distinguished the contested regulation from 
the measure at issue in its earlier order in Case C-123/92 Lezzi Pietro v Commission [1993] 
ECR I-809.
68 Case C-340/08 The Queen on the application of M and Others v HM Treasury, judgment 
of 29 April 2010, nyr (M v HM Treasury). For a previous case pertaining to the interpretation 
of the sanctions regime, see Case C-117/06 Möllendorf-Niehuus [2007] ECR I-8361.
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authorities of the Member States have determined to be, with the approval 
of the Sanctions Committee, necessary to cover basic expenses, such as 
payments for food, rent and medical treatment. The UK Treasury decided 
that various social security benefits, including income support and housing 
benefit, payable to spouses of listed persons, were caught by the prohibition 
in Article 2(2). The rationale of the Treasury was that, because the above 
benefits might be used to cover the basic needs of households to which 
listed persons belong, they are made indirectly available for their benefit 
within the meaning of Article 2(2). Consequently, the Treasury decided that 
such benefits could be paid only if they were covered by an exception under 
Article 2a, which took the form of a licence. Such licences were issued to 
various public authorities, permitting them to continue to pay social ben-
efits to spouses of listed persons, subject to certain conditions. The House 
of Lords considered that the Treasury’s licensing system made for an intru-
sive regime that was not required by Article 2(2), and sought a preliminary 
reference on whether the payment of social security benefits to the spouses 
of listed persons was caught by the prohibition in Article 2(2). 
The Court of Justice answered in the negative. It identified differences 
in the various language versions of the Regulation and held that a literal 
interpretation of Article 2(2) was not by itself capable of establishing its 
meaning. It noted that, in the English version, the prohibition in Article 
2(2) included making funds available indirectly for the benefit of a listed 
person, and would thus cover the payment of a social security benefit to 
the spouse of a listed person. Whilst that interpretation was also supported 
by the Hungarian, Dutch, Finnish and Swedish versions, other groups of 
languages did not countenance it.69 The Court of Justice also identified 
differences in the language versions of the UNSC resolutions to which 
the Regulation was intended to give effect. In view of such divergences, it 
held that Article 2(2) must be interpreted in the light of the purpose and 
the general scheme of the legislation of which it formed part, and account 
must also be taken of the substance of Resolution 1390 (2002), to which it 
intended to give effect.70
The Court held that, in the light of the objectives of the Regulation, 
the sanctions applied only to those assets that could be turned into funds, 
goods or services capable of being used to support terrorist activities.71 
Essentially, in the circumstances of the case, the Treasury had followed an 
69 The Court held that in the Spanish, French, Portuguese and Romanian texts, the prohi-
bition referred to the ‘use’ of funds for the benefit of a listed person. These versions did not 
support the argument that, by making social security benefits available to the spouses of listed 
persons, the authorities used those funds for the benefit of the latter. A third group of language 
versions, such as those in German and Italian, did not fall within either of the above categories 
and used their own terminology. See M v HM Treasury, above n 68, para 43.
70 Ibid, para 49.
71 Ibid, paras 54–58.
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erroneous interpretation of Article 2(2). Its construction was not based on 
any danger whatsoever that the social security benefits might be diverted in 
order to support terrorist activities. It had not been argued that the spouses 
concerned handed over those funds to a listed person instead of allocating 
them to their basic household expenses. Such a misappropriation of funds 
would, in any event, be covered by Article 2(2) and constitute an offence 
punishable under national criminal law. It was also hard to imagine how 
those funds could support terrorist activities, since the benefits were fixed 
at a level intended to meet only strictly vital needs.72
Thus, in M v HM Treasury the Court was led to a narrow interpretation 
of Article 2(2) on the basis of a teleological interpretation. It is notable, 
however, that it did not look at the objectives of the Regulation before 
establishing textual ambiguity in the light of the linguistic variations of 
Article 2(2). Its greater reliance upon the text is attributable to the fact that 
the measure in issue was a regulation, which needs to be applied uniformly 
throughout the EU.
Although human rights considerations are present in the judgment, they 
are less prominent than in the Kadi line of cases. The Court gave an addi-
tional reason in favour of a narrow interpretation of Article 2(2). Applying 
the presumption of constitutional interpretation, it held that, in construing 
EU legislation, preference should be given, as far as possible, to the inter-
pretation which renders the provision consistent with the general principles 
of EU law and, more specifically, the principle of legal certainty.73 That 
principle requires that legislation which imposes economic sanctions and 
involves the imposition of penalties for their infringement must be clear and 
precise so that the persons concerned, including third parties such as the 
social security bodies involved in the main proceedings, may know unam-
biguously their rights and duties. A construction which would bring the 
payment of social security benefits within the scope of Article 2(2) would 
engender legal uncertainty, in particular in triangular situations where funds 
are made available not to a listed person but someone close to him.74
What are the implications of the judgment? Since the payment of a social 
security benefit is not covered by the prohibition in Article 2(2), it follows 
that it cannot be made subject to a licence under UK implementing meas-
ures. It must be paid to the spouse freely, without the need to be covered 
by the exception in Article 2a.75 If, however, instead of being allocated to 
72 Ibid, paras 59–61.
73 Ibid, para 64.
74 Ibid, paras 64–66.
75 The Court also stated that the narrow interpretation of Art 2(2) did not render the excep-
tion in Art 2a superfluous. That exception applies in cases where funds are made available 
directly or indirectly to a listed person and not to a third party, since, in such cases, the listed 
person can decide how to use those funds, and this in turn involves a danger of their being 
diverted for terrorist purposes: see ibid, para 71.
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meeting basic household or other permissible expenses, the benefit was 
diverted in order to support terrorist activities, that would be a violation 
of the prohibition in Article 2(2) and carry criminal penalties under the UK 
implementing legislation.76 
An interesting question which arises here is this: can the Treasury intro-
duce a licensing system not on the basis that the payment of a social security 
benefit to a spouse is prohibited under Article 2(2), but in order to enforce 
the prohibition in that article, ie as a mechanism to ensure that such pay-
ments cannot be diverted to terrorist activities? The answer appears to be 
in the affirmative. It would then be a matter of examining the conditions to 
which payment of the benefit was made subject. The judgment in M v HM 
Treasury should not be read as prohibiting a licensing system but as allow-
ing one insofar as it is necessary to ensure compliance with the prohibition 
in Article 2(2), and subject to respect for human rights and the principle of 
proportionality. The unspoken principles underlying the reasoning of the 
Court are respect for human dignity and the right to family life. The condi-
tions to which payment of the social security benefit was subject appeared 
too harsh and in breach of the right to dignity and the right to family life, 
although the Court did not expressly state this.77
C. Sanctions against nuclear proliferation
Othman and Hassan contrast with Melli Bank,78 where the General Court 
upheld the freezing of assets of a UK bank in implementation of a sanc-
tions regime seeking to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The 
case raised interesting issues pertaining, inter alia, to the vigour of judicial 
review, the Council’s discretionary powers and the risk assessment carried 
out by the General Court.
The origins of the case lie in sanctions imposed by the UNSC on Iran. 
Melli Bank plc was a UK subsidiary of BMI, an Iranian bank controlled by 
the Iranian State. The assets of both banks were frozen by Council Decision 
2008/475/EC,79 adopted on the basis of Council Regulation 423/2007/EC80 
76 Ibid, paras 58–59.
77 These conditions were the following: (a) the benefits had to be paid into a bank account 
from which the spouse concerned could draw only £10 in cash for each member of the house-
hold; other payments had to be made by debit card; (b) the spouse concerned had to send a 
monthly account to the Treasury detailing all her expenditure and enclosing receipts for the 
goods purchased and a bank statement; (c) the licence included a warning to the spouse that it 
was a criminal offence to make funds available to her husband since he was a listed person. See 
the Al-Qa’eda and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2002 (SI 2002/111), Art 7.
78 Joined Cases T-246 & T-332/08 Melli Bank plc v Council [2009] ECR II- 2629 (Melli 
Bank).
79 [2008] OJ L163/29.
80 [2007] OJ L103/1.
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which, in turn, gave effect to UNSC Resolution 1737 (2006). Article 7(1) of 
Regulation 423/2007/EC provides for the freezing of funds of the persons 
and entities designated by the Security Council. Article 7(2) extends the 
sanctions to persons and entities associated with Iran’s nuclear programme. 
More specifically, Article 7(2)(a) and (b) provide for the freezing of funds 
of entities which have been identified as being engaged in, directly associ-
ated with or providing support for, Iran’s nuclear activities. Furthermore, 
Article 7(2)(d) provides for the freezing of funds of a legal person owned or 
controlled by an entity referred to under Article 7(2)(a) or (b). The assets 
of BMI were frozen under Article 7(2). The freezing order was extended to 
Melli Bank’s assets on the basis of Article 7(2)(d), ie as an entity owned or 
controlled by BMI.
Melli Bank argued that Article 7(2)(d) did not require the Council to 
freeze automatically the assets of all legal persons owned or controlled by 
entities whose funds had been frozen by virtue of Article 7(2)(a) or (b), 
and that if Article 7(2)(d) was interpreted to remove all discretion from 
the Council, it would run counter to the principle of proportionality. The 
General Court rejected this argument based on a textual analysis and a 
teleological interpretation founded on a cautious assessment of risk.
The General Court held that Article 7(2)(d) uses peremptory language, 
which states that all funds belonging to an entity owned or controlled by a 
person engaged in nuclear proliferation ‘shall be frozen’. It followed that the 
freezing of funds was obligatory. The Council was under an obligation to 
undertake an evaluation in order to determine whether an entity is ‘owned 
or controlled’ by a person identified as engaged in nuclear proliferation, but, 
once such ownership or control was ascertained, the Council enjoyed no 
discretion.81 The General Court held that this interpretation was also in line 
with the objectives of the Regulation, which were to prevent nuclear prolif-
eration and, more generally, maintain international peace and security.82 
The General Court further held that in determining whether an entity 
was owned or controlled by another body, the Council had to take into 
account all the relevant aspects of the specific case, such as the degree of 
operational independence of the entity or the possible effect of the supervi-
sion to which it was subject by public regulators. In contrast, the nature 
of that entity’s activities and the possible lack of any link between those 
activities and nuclear proliferation were not relevant criteria. Applying a 
risk-averse approach, the General Court held83:
When the funds of an entity identified as being engaged in nuclear proliferation 
are frozen, there is a not insignificant danger that that entity may exert pressure 
81 Melli Bank, above n 78, paras 63–65.
82 Ibid, para 66.
83 Ibid, para 103.
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on the entities it owns or controls in order to circumvent the effect of the measures 
applying to it, by encouraging them either to transfer their funds to it, directly or 
indirectly, or to carry out transactions which it cannot itself perform by reason 
of the freezing of its funds. That being so, it must be considered that the freez-
ing of the funds of entities owned or controlled by an entity identified as being 
engaged in nuclear proliferation is necessary and appropriate in order to ensure 
the effectiveness of the measures adopted vis-à-vis that entity and to ensure that 
those measures are not circumvented.
The General Court also found that other, less restrictive mechanisms might 
not guarantee fulfilment of the objectives of the Regulation. Thus, the 
existence of rules prohibiting the carrying out of transactions with entities 
identified as being engaged in terrorism was not in itself a guarantee that 
such transactions would not take place. Neither could the reinforcement of 
supervision or financial transparency fill the risk gap.84
There are apparent similarities between M v HM Treasury and Melli 
Bank. Both cases involved the imposition of sanctions on persons asso-
ciated with the primary targets of the sanctions regime. The similarities 
are superficial, however, whilst the differences are striking. In M v HM 
Treasury, the funds in question were insignificant; in Melli Bank, human 
dignity, personal freedom and the right to life were not an issue. Melli Bank 
involved a banking group controlled by the State which was the subject of 
sanctions. The General Court was correct to apply a high standard of scru-
tiny to the existence of ownership or control, but a lower standard when 
addressing the legislature’s assessment of risk.
The General Court opted for a substantive rather than formal interpre-
tation of the concept of control. It held that ownership of a company by 
another is not in itself a determinative criterion. It had to be examined 
whether, because the applicant was owned by BMI, there was a considerable 
likelihood that it might be prompted to circumvent the sanctions adopted 
against its parent company.85 The General Court sought guidance from 
competition law as to when the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to 
a parent undertaking,86 and placed particular emphasis upon the powers 
of the parent to appoint the directors of the subsidiary. It held that the fact 
that one entity is wholly owned by another generally means that the latter 
is entitled to appoint the directors of the former, and it may therefore exer-
cise actual control over its management and its staff.87 Whilst the General 
Court left the door open for the possibility that the freezing of funds of a 
company which is owned by a listed person may not be justified, this would 
84 Ibid, paras 71, 17 and 108.
85 Ibid, para 121.
86 See ibid, para 121, referring to Case 48/69 Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission 
[1972] ECR 619, para 133, and Case C-73/95 P Viho v Commission [1996] ECR I-5457, 
para 16. 
87 Melli Bank, above n 78, para 123.
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occur only in ‘extraordinary circumstances’.88 The fact that the applicant 
was wholly owned by BMI created a presumption that was very difficult 
to rebut and which the applicant failed to displace in the circumstances. 
Thus, the fact that BMI did not intervene in the day-to-day running of the 
applicant was of no relevance since it did not affect the influence exerted 
by BMI, directly or indirectly, over the applicant’s staff.89 The fact that the 
applicant had complied with all the restrictive measures and the applicable 
sanctions was also irrelevant. Likewise, the dissuasive nature of the penal-
ties to which the members of the applicant’s staff would be exposed was 
insufficient, since there was a risk that the violation of the sanctions could 
be disguised by the use of intermediaries. In short, the General Court con-
sidered that ex post facto means of intervention were no substitute for a 
strict preventative regime.
The General Court also upheld the autonomy of the Council’s power to 
impose economic sanctions under Article 7(2). It will be remembered that 
Article 7(1) of the Regulation provides for the freezing of funds of persons 
designated by the UN Security Council. The General Court held that Article 
7(2) was independent of the adoption of economic sanctions by the UNSC, 
its purpose being to enable the Council to adopt sanctions against enti-
ties that were not the subject of similar measures decided by the Security 
Council. This had two implications. First, it meant that the compatibility 
of Article 7(2)(d) with the principle of subsidiarity could not be assessed 
by reference to the relevant UNSC Resolution. Secondly, the applicant 
could not claim that the imposition of sanctions on it under this subsection 
unjustifiably equated it with entities on which the Security Council had 
imposed sanctions since the criteria for their imposition in each case were 
different.90
The General Court considered that the statement of reasons provided by 
the Council, although ‘exceptionally concise’, was sufficient to satisfy the 
requirement of reasoning. It also rejected that the right to property and the 
right to carry on an economic activity had been breached, recalling that they 
are not absolute prerogatives and that the importance of combating nuclear 
proliferation was such as to justify substantial negative consequences.91
Melli Bank suggests a more nuanced approach to the assessment of risk 
than other cases on economic sanctions. However, the material differences 
between Melli Bank and those cases concerning the imposition of sanctions 
against suspected terrorists are the legislative background of the sanctions 
regime, the undisputed proximity of the applicant with the main target of 
sanctions and the lack of engagement of civil liberties. The case had more 
88 Ibid, para 124.
89 Ibid, para 125.
90 Ibid, paras 103 and 138.
91 Ibid, paras 111–12.
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to do with substantive policies than with process rights, and the General 
Court was correct to defer to the choices of the Council.
 IV. THE UK SUPREME COURT AND THE SEARCH FOR ‘OLDER, 
NOBLER, MORE ENDURING VALUES’
The UN sanctions regime has also given rise to important issues pertaining 
to the rule of law in English courts.92 It is fitting that the first case heard 
by the new Supreme Court of the United Kingdom raised issues pertain-
ing to constitutionalism, human rights and the separation of powers. In 
Jabar Ahmed,93 the facts were that the Treasury had frozen the funds of 
the appellants on the basis of delegated legislation passed to give effect 
to UNSC resolutions. The appellants fell into two groups. Those in the 
first group had been classified as designated persons under the Terrorism 
(United Nations Measures) Order 2006 (SI 2006/2657) (‘the TO’) which 
had been adopted to give effect to UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001). Those 
in the second group had had their resources frozen under the Al-Qaida 
and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 SI 2006/2952) (‘the 
AQO’) as persons whose names appeared in the UN Sanctions Committee 
List.94 That list had been adopted by the Sanction Committee under UNSC 
Resolution 1333 (2000), which required UN Member States to freeze the 
funds of Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and all other individuals 
or entities associated with them.
Both the TO and the AQO had been made by the Treasury under powers 
conferred by section 1 of the United Nations Act 1946 by which the UK 
gave effect to the UN Charter. Section 1 enables the Government to take, 
by Order in Council, any measures which are ‘necessary or expedient’ to 
implement UNSC resolutions adopted under Article 41 of the Charter. The 
fundamental issue in the case was whether the Treasury had power under 
section 1 to introduce economic sanctions by means of an Order in Council. 
The Supreme Court answered in the negative, applying a separation of 
powers rationale and relying upon the principle of legality. At the heart 
of the Court’s distrust lay the fact that orders made under section 1 of the 
92 The quote in the heading comes from Lord Bingham, ‘The Case of Liversidge v Anderson: 
The Rule of Law Amid the Clash of Arms’ (2009) 43 The International Lawyer 33, 38, where 
he stated: ‘[W]e are entitled to be proud that even in that extreme national emergency there 
was one voice—eloquent and courageous—which asserted older, nobler, more enduring values: 
the right of the individual against the state; the duty to govern in accordance with law; the role 
of the courts as guarantor of legality and individual right; the priceless gift, subject only to con-
straints by law established, of individual freedom.’ It was cited with approval by Lord Hope in 
HM Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others [2010] UKSC 2 (Jabar Ahmed), at [6].
93 Above n 92.
94 One of the appellants, identified as appellant G, had been designated under both the TO 
and the AQO.
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1946 Act are not subject to any Parliamentary scrutiny. They are simply 
laid before Parliament for information; the UK Parliament does not have 
any input as to their content. The judgment raised a number of issues, and 
the reasoning of the Supreme Court calls for detailed consideration. The 
two pieces of delegated legislation, the TO and the AQO, give rise to dif-
ferent issues and should be examined separately. 
A. The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006
The TO was introduced to give effect to UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001), 
paragraph (c) of which required States to freeze the funds and other finan-
cial resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts, 
or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts. The TO 
empowered the Treasury to freeze the funds, inter alia, of any person where 
it had ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting’ that the person was involved in 
the commission of terrorist acts. The question was whether, by extend-
ing the sanctions to such suspects, the Treasury had exceeded the powers 
granted to it under section 1 of the 1946 Act.
The Supreme Court gave an affirmative reply. The starting point of its 
reasoning was the principle of legality. Under this principle, as articulated 
by Lord Hoffmann in Simms,95 where Parliament intends to legislate con-
trary to human rights, it has to use clear and unambiguous language. In 
the absence of express language or necessary implication, the courts will 
presume that the general words of a statute are intended to be subject to the 
basic rights of the individual.96 This dictated a narrow interpretation of the 
1946 Act. Given the harsh effects of the freezing regime on human rights, 
the TO was found to be beyond the scope of the 1946 Act.
Lord Hope stated that since the UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) was not 
phrased in terms of reasonable suspicion and left the standard of proof to the 
Member States to decide, it was not necessary to introduce the reasonable 
suspicion test in order to comply with the Resolution. Lord Phillips agreed 
that the TO was beyond the scope of the 1946 Act. After reviewing the word-
ing of Resolution 1373 and other UNSC resolutions, he came to the view 
that Resolution 1373 did not require expressly or by implication the freezing 
of the assets of those who were merely suspected of criminal offences.97 All 
of their Lordships agreed that the consequences of the freezing of assets were 
dire, and therefore the expediency test of section 1 was not met. Lord Hope 
95 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131; 
see also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Pierson [1998] AC 539, 
573 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
96 Ex parte Simms, above n 95, 131.
97 Jabar Ahmed, above n 92, at [137].
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stated that the powers of the Treasury were draconian and struck ‘at the 
very heart of the individual’s basic rights to live his own life as he chooses’.98 
Notably, he endorsed Sedley LJ’s dictum in the Court of Appeal that the 
sanctions regime interfered not only with the economic freedoms of the 
individuals involved, but also, ultimately, with their freedom of movement. 
Designated persons effectively became ‘prisoners of the State’.99 Lord Rodger 
stated that if measures which affect very basic rights of the individual are to 
be taken, it is for Parliament to deliberate and determine that the benefits of 
giving the Treasury such powers outweigh the potential disadvantages, and 
that it is therefore expedient to adopt such measures to fulfil the obligations 
arising from UNSC Resolution 1373.100 He considered, however, that sec-
tion 1 of the 1946 Act would authorise the Government to make an Order 
in Council, even with these far-reaching effects, provided that it had only a 
limited life-span and was replaced, as soon as practically possible, by equiva-
lent legislation passed by Parliament. In this way, the United Kingdom could 
promptly fulfil its obligations under the United Nations Charter.101 
Some aspects of the Supreme Court’s reasoning are particularly instruc-
tive. Lord Hope took into account that other UN Member States had 
introduced measures to comply with UNSC resolutions through primary 
legislation which had included safeguards, and had not found it necessary 
to rely exclusively upon unlimited delegation of powers to the executive.102 
He also noted that the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which 
had been enacted in the aftermath of the events of 9/11, made provision 
for freezing orders which were more precisely worded and contained vari-
ous safeguards. The orders made under the 2001 Act were subject to the 
affirmative resolution procedure and ceased to have effect after two years. 
He stated that the powers given under that Act and orders passed to imple-
ment it would have enabled the Government to comply with the UNSC 
resolutions.
B. The Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2006
The applicants whose resources had been frozen on the basis of the AQO 
were in a different position, in that they had been subject to freezing orders 
not on the basis of a reasonable suspicion, but because their names had 
been included in the list maintained by the UN Sanctions Committee set 
up by UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999). Here, the Treasury had not gone 
 98 Ibid, at [60].
 99 Ibid, at [125].
100 Ibid, at [174].
101 Ibid, at [176]. 
102 Ibid, at [50].
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beyond what was strictly required to comply with the UNSC Resolution. 
The applicants argued that: 
a)  the AQO was unlawful because it breached Articles 6 and 8 ECHR, 
and Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR; and 
b)  the AQO was ultra vires section 1 of the 1946 Act because there was 
no judicial remedy against the 1267 Committee. 
The first claim was unanimously rejected while the second was accepted.
The claim that the AQO was unlawful because it breached the European 
Convention was rejected essentially for two reasons. First, all of their 
Lordships rejected the argument that the validity of the AQO could be 
tested by reference to the articles of the ECHR on the ground that, under 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, obligations under the Charter take pre-
cedence over any other obligations arising under international law. The 
Supreme Court thus fully endorsed the judgment of the House of Lords in 
Al-Jedda103 and Lord Bingham’s dictum to the effect that, if there were a 
conflict between the requirements of a UNSC resolution and the require-
ments of the European Convention, English courts would have no option 
but to give primacy to the former. Secondly, there was no conclusive proof 
that the European Court of Human Rights would itself find a breach of the 
Convention. Lord Phillips, in particular, read the judgment in Behrami104 
as suggesting that the European Court of Human Rights was prepared to 
recognise the primacy of obligations under the UN Charter over Convention 
obligations.105
The appellant also argued that the AQO was contrary to rights emanat-
ing from the common law, namely the right to peaceful enjoyment of prop-
erty and the right of unimpeded access to a court, neither of which could 
be interfered with except by clear legislative words. Those rights emanated 
from common law and therefore their application remained unaffected by 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, which provides for primacy only over inter-
national obligations. This argument proved successful. 
Lord Hope accepted that the AQO was beyond the scope of section 1 of 
the 1946 Act because it exceeded the threshold of permissible interference 
with fundamental rights. The procedure for listing and de-listing persons 
before the UN Sanctions Committee did not meet the basic standards of 
natural justice and procedural fairness. Listed persons were not given rea-
sons for their listing. It was not clear who the members of the Committee 
were, what rules of evidence they applied or what, if any, degree of indepen-
dence they enjoyed. In adopting the 1946 Act, Parliament could not have 
103 R (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2008] AC 332.
104 Joined Cases 71412/01 Behrami and Behrami v France, and 78166/01 Saramati v 
France, Germany and Norway (2007) 45 EHRR SE10.
105 Jabar Ahmed, above n 92, at [93]–[98].
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intended to authorise such extensive interference with fundamental rights 
by a procedure which avoided Parliamentary scrutiny.106 Lord Phillips 
noted that the UN had gone some way towards addressing human rights 
concerns. United Nations Guidelines made provision for notifying a listed 
individual of those parts of a Member State’s statement of the case against 
him that the State considered could publicly be released. Further, UNSC 
Resolution 1730 made express provision for de-listing. Those provisions, 
however, fell far short of satisfying the right of access to a court and of 
fulfilling the requirement for reasoning.107
Lord Brown was the only partially dissenting voice, coming to the con-
clusion that the TO should be struck down but that the AQO should stand. 
In his view, the two orders could be distinguished. The TO, by extending 
the sanctions to persons reasonably suspected of association with terrorism, 
went beyond what was necessary to give effect to UNSC Resolution 1373. 
The AQO, by contrast, implemented faithfully the UNSC resolutions to 
which it sought to give effect.108 Lord Brown accepted that the AQO was 
contrary to fundamental principles of human rights but viewed this as the 
inevitable result of UNSC Resolution 1267. He argued that interference 
with human rights should be subject to Parliamentary approval because, 
that way, it is made subject to political control and Parliament pays the 
‘political cost’ due for interfering with the basic freedoms of the individual. 
But in this case the political cost rationale did not apply. Given the primacy 
of UN resolutions under Article 103 of the Charter and the unambiguous 
obligations flowing from UNSC Resolution 1267, ‘there could surely be no 
political cost in doing what, unless we were flagrantly to violate our UN 
Charter obligations, the UK had no alternative but to do’.109 This some-
what functional approach to the principle of legality was rightly rejected by 
Lord Rodger, who stressed the value of transparency and political control. 
In his view, the essential issue was that severe restrictions upon human 
rights should not pass unnoticed in the Parliamentary process and should 
be decided by the legislature rather than the executive.110
C. Assessment of the judgment
The judgment in Jabar Ahmed raises a number of important issues, not 
all of which can be examined within the confines of this chapter. Suffice it 
106 Ibid, at [77]–[80].
107 Ibid, at [149].
108 Ibid, at [199].
109 Ibid, at [204].
110 Ibid, at [186].
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here to explore some aspects pertaining to the rule of law and some issues 
concerning the relevance of EU law.
The Supreme Court appeared to attribute particular importance to the 
lack of Parliamentary scrutiny. Both the TO and the AQO were adopted 
without any Parliamentary oversight. Lord Hope found it unacceptable to 
confer unlimited discretion upon the executive in deciding how to imple-
ment UNSC resolutions, in the making of which the executive itself had 
participated. That would conflict with ‘the basic rules that lie at the heart 
of our democracy’.111
It will be remembered that the TO was found to be ultra vires because 
it exceeded what was necessary to implement Resolution 1373 (2001) 
to which it sought to give effect, whilst the AQO was found to be ultra 
vires because it made severe inroads into basic human rights which can 
be introduced only by primary legislation. This gives rise to the following 
question in relation to the TO: what would be the response of the Supreme 
Court if Resolution 1373 (2001) were expressly to cast the net wider and 
require the freezing of resources of those reasonably suspected of being 
associated with terrorism? Clearly, in such a case, the argument could be 
made that an Order in Council was necessary or expedient to implement 
the resolution. It would still be necessary, however, to examine whether the 
requirements of the principle of legality were satisfied. The question would 
be whether an Order in Council, adopted without Parliamentary scrutiny, 
freezing the assets of individuals, would fall within the scope of the delega-
tion of powers permitted by section 1 of the 1946 Act. The Supreme Court 
accepted that some interference with human rights is possible by Orders in 
Council in order to give effect to UNSC resolutions. The question is how 
much interference the Court would be prepared to tolerate under delegated 
legislation. It may be argued that the AQO imposed a more severe limita-
tion upon human rights than the TO, since it foreclosed any possibility 
of judicial review. Still, it is an open question whether in our hypothetical 
example an Order in Council would survive scrutiny. First, the effects of the 
freezing of assets on the personal life of the individuals concerned attracted 
much criticism by the Supreme Court and were described as ‘traumatic’.112 
Secondly, their permanent character exacerbated their restrictive effects. 
Under the TO, the freezing of funds was permanent, which made its intru-
sion into personal freedom and the rights of the individual particularly 
onerous.113
The Supreme Court held in essence that UNSC resolutions which inter-
fere severely with basic human rights may not be introduced by delegated 
111 Ibid, at [45].
112 Ibid, at [203], per Lord Brown. 
113 See ibid, at [230], per Lord Mance. 
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legislation which is not subject to Parliamentary scrutiny.114 It is clear that 
both the TO and the AQO could be introduced by primary legislation. 
This raises the following question: to what human rights limitations, if any, 
would primary legislation passed to comply with obligations arising from a 
UNSC resolution be subject? This issue was not examined by the Supreme 
Court. 
A possible source of limitations might be provided by the Human Rights Act 
1998. So long as Al Jedda remains good law, however, the Convention cannot 
trump obligations arising from the UN Charter. The Supreme Court might 
revisit its position in the event that in Al Jedda the Strasbourg Court takes 
the view that the UN Charter does not take precedence over the Convention. 
Even in such a case, it would be a matter for English law to decide whether to 
give priority to the Convention rather than the UN Charter and how conflict-
ing obligations arising under the two systems might be compromised. 
A second source of limitation may be found in EU law. Insofar as 
Member States act within the scope of EU law, they have an obligation to 
respect fundamental rights as guaranteed in the EU legal order.115 Under 
Article 6 of the TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, there are essen-
tially three sources of such rights: the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights; 
the European Convention; and the general principles of law articulated by 
the Court of Justice. This point is explored further below.116 
A third limitation is found in jus cogens. English courts will not give 
effect to a UK statute which violates the peremptory rules of international 
law, although those rules are not defined with clarity and, in general, are so 
basic that this safeguard will provide protection only in the most extreme 
of cases.
A fourth limitation may be found in common law and stems from the 
principle of legality. As Lord Hope put it in Jabar Ahmed, the more a mea-
sure affects the basic rights of the individual, ‘the more exacting this scrutiny 
must become’.117 English courts will apply a presumption of constitutional-
ity under which a statute will not be interpreted to deny a fundamental right 
unless the intention of the Parliament to this effect is crystal clear. Within 
the UK constitutional system, which is based upon the fundamental prin-
ciple of Parliamentary supremacy, the determining criterion is the intention 
of Parliament. It would thus be a question of what kind of language the 
Parliament must use to persuade the courts that it authorises the executive 
114 All their Lordships appeared to agree that a freezing of funds could be introduced by 
primary legislation. Whether it could also be introduced by delegated legislation which gave a 
greater role to Parliament, eg an Order in Council which was subject to the affirmative resolu-
tion procedure, remains an open question, although it is clear from the judgment that such a 
move would not be viewed favourably by the Supreme Court. 
115 See Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925.
116 See section IV.D. below.
117 Jabar Ahmed, above n 92, at [45].
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to breach human rights. The judgment in Jabar Ahmed suggests that the 
Supreme Court is prepared to apply the principle of legality with an asphyxi-
ating effect. Thus, where primary legislation seeks to implement a UNSC 
resolution that denies a fundamental right, the Court’s inquiry is likely to 
focus on two aspects. First, it will look at the precise wording of the UNSC 
resolution to determine what effect it intends to have on human rights and 
the scope of the restriction it seeks to introduce. Given the UN’s own com-
mitment to human rights, the Court is likely to apply a strict construction 
to interferences with human rights and give the benefit of the doubt to an 
interpretation that provides for the least intrusion possible. Secondly, the 
Court will examine closely the domestic statute and will expect a high degree 
of precision. Any interference with human rights that is not absolutely neces-
sary to comply with the UNSC resolution to which the statute intends to give 
effect, as that resolution is interpreted by the Court, will not be acceptable 
since Parliament will be presumed not to have intended to implement it. 
The difference between English law and EU law is that the former, within 
the confines of the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, understands the 
principle of legality as a rule of construction. English courts will not under-
stand the intention of Parliament to be to violate fundamental rights unless 
Parliament expressly states that this is so and uses the clearest and most 
specific language possible.118 By contrast, this will not do for the EU legis-
lature. Even if the Council makes it clear that it wishes to act in breach of 
fundamental rights as they are protected in the EU, the Court of Justice will 
strike the measure down, however clear the language used by the Council. 
In that respect, EU law subscribes to a substantive version of the rule of law, 
whilst English law follows a (more) formal one. This is not to say, however, 
that the Court of Justice will necessarily follow a stricter level of scrutiny 
than that followed by English courts. Neither is it to say that the Court of 
Justice will necessarily exercise review of the merits rather than review of 
procedure. The difference of principle is fundamental, but the difference in 
results may be less so. As Lord Hoffmann put it in Simms, by the principle 
of legality English courts manage to apply 
principles of constitutionality little different from those which exist in coun-
tries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional 
 document.119 
118 Note, however, that the principle of legality may not go as far as the duty of consistent 
interpretation imposed on English courts by s 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. That sec-
tion requires that, so far as it is possible to do so, legislation must be read and given effect to 
in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. Lord Phillips stated that the principle 
of legality does not permit a court to disregard an unambiguous expression of Parliament 
intention, although in some cases s 3(1) has been understood as enabling courts to do precisely 
that: see ibid, at [117].
119 Ex parte Simms, above n 95, 131, cited with approval by Lord Phillips in Jabar Ahmed, 
above n 92, at [111].
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The procedural character of the principle of legality under English law 
provides a discipline for the accurate and specific drafting of legislation 
which is absent in EU law. The narrow interpretation given by the Supreme 
Court to the powers granted to the executive by the 1946 Act contrasts 
sharply with the readiness of the Court of Justice in Kadi to accept that 
the EU had power to adopt economic sanctions against individuals on the 
somewhat feeble basis of Articles 215, 75, 352 TFEU (ex Articles 301, 
60(1) and 308 EC).120 
D. Influence of EU law
The influence of EU law in Jabar Ahmed was only secondary and indirect. 
The appellants argued that the AQO ran counter to the right to a fair 
trial, the right to respect for family life and the right to property as protected 
by the ECHR. They conceded that the judgment of the House of Lords in 
Al Jedda established the primacy of the UN Charter over obligations flow-
ing from the Convention, but invited the Supreme Court to reconsider Al 
Jedda in the light of Kadi. The thrust of the argument was that, in the light 
of Kadi, the Strasbourg Court, before which Al Jedda was pending, could 
rule that Article 103 of the UN Charter did not trump the Convention. This 
argument was precarious. The Supreme Court rightly held that it could not 
speculate on how the European Court of Human Rights would decide in Al 
Jedda.121 It placed emphasis on that Court’s judgment in Behrami and took 
a narrow view of Kadi.
Although the Supreme Court was correct to hold that it would be inap-
propriate to prejudge the result that the Strasbourg Court might reach in 
Al Jedda, the existing authorities make it far from clear that the European 
Court of Human Rights will accept unequivocally the primacy of UN 
obligations over the Convention. If that were not to be the case, English 
courts would be in the unenviable position of having to face a head-on 
clash between Convention rights and obligations emanating from the UN 
Charter. The solution offered by Lord Bingham in Al Jedda is that, in such 
a case, the Government must comply with the UN Charter whilst ensur-
ing that the rights guaranteed by the Convention are not infringed to any 
greater extent than is inherent in the action necessary to comply with the 
relevant UN resolution.122 It seems that this would entail a balancing exer-
cise performed by reference to a principle of proportionality applied not as 
a matter of the Convention, but as a matter of English law.
120 See section I. above.
121 See, eg, Al-Jedda, above n 103, para 74, per Lord Hope.
122 Ibid, para 39, per Lord Bingham.
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Although the relevance of Kadi in Jabar Ahmed was only indirect, the 
reading of the Court of Justice’s Kadi judgment by the Supreme Court was 
somewhat narrow. Lord Phillips stated that the judgment concerned ‘the 
legitimacy of a Council Regulation judged against the rules of the autono-
mous and self-contained regime instituted under the EC Treaty’.123 This was 
echoed by Lord Brown124 and supported by Lord Hope, who pointed out 
that the Court of Justice did not have to face the problem of primacy of UN 
obligations which Article 103 of the Charter raises for the Member States 
of the UN, since the institutions of the EU are not party to the Charter.125 
In Kadi, however, the Court of Justice did not base its reasoning on the fact 
that neither the European Community nor the EU is a contracting party to 
the UN. Rather, it stated that review of the contested Council Regulation 
which implemented the sanctions list resolution ‘would not entail any 
challenge to the primacy of that resolution in international law’.126 Thus, 
the Court of Justice based its reasoning on the fact that Article 103 of the 
UN Charter binds the Member States of the UN only in international law 
and does not interfere with their internal constitutional arrangements. For 
the Member States of the EU, part of those arrangements is the principle 
of primacy of EU law and the other obligations which flow from their EU 
membership. Thus, if one were to follow the Court of Justice’s federalist 
rationale as it can be derived from the existing case law, obligations arising 
from EU law will take precedence over obligations arising from the UN 
Charter since, for the purposes of Article 103 of the UN Charter, EU law 
has to be seen as an integral part of national law. The EU, in other words, 
establishes an internal constitutional space for all EU Member States which 
forms part of the domestic law of each Member State, and which is not 
penetrated by the sharp end of Article 103 of the Charter.
Thus, whilst the implication from Jabar Ahmed is that the judgment 
in Kadi does not have an impact upon national measures adopted to give 
effect to UNSC resolutions, this is by no means clear from the reasoning of 
the Court of Justice in Kadi itself. In Jabar Ahmed, the Court was not faced 
with the argument that the AQO might fall within the scope of EU law 
and therefore that human rights as protected by the EU legal order must be 
respected. It is worth examining this scenario in more detail.
Suppose that the name of an EU national, who is resident in the UK and 
who carries on economic activities in other EU States and regularly moves 
funds from the UK to other States, is included in the UN sanctions list. The 
freezing of his assets is clearly a restriction upon his right to free movement. 
The precise freedom which may be engaged is less relevant and it would 
123 Jabar Ahmed, above n 92, at [104], per Lord Phillips.
124 Ibid, at [203].
125 Ibid, at [71].
126 Kadi, above n 1, para 288.
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depend on the facts. It could be the free movement of capital, his freedom of 
establishment, or his freedom to provide services. The justification for this 
restriction is to be found in the need to safeguard public security, to combat 
terrorism and ensure international peace and security, and to comply with 
the UNSC resolutions which dictate the inclusion of his name in the sanc-
tions list. Under the established case law of the Court of Justice, however, a 
restriction on free movement can be justified only if it respects fundamental 
rights as protected in EU law.127 Does that mean that a national measure 
implementing the sanctions list must observe EU fundamental rights? The 
Government could counter-argue that, under Article 351(1) TFEU (ex Article 
307(1) EC), obligations arising from pre-existing international agreements 
concluded by the Member States are not to be affected by the provisions of 
the EU Treaties. On this basis, EU human rights would not be applicable 
since the individual EU States’ membership of the UN precedes their mem-
bership of the European Community and the EU. 
This argument, however, encounters an important objection. Article 
351(1) TFEU does not give the complete picture. Article 351(2) TFEU (ex 
Article 307(2) EC) states that, to the extent that pre-existing international 
agreements are not compatible with the EU Treaties, Member States must 
take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established. 
This is a ‘best efforts’ clause which has received a strict interpretation 
favourable to the EU. It follows that, insofar as a UNSC resolution breaches 
fundamental rights as guaranteed by EU law, Member States, including 
national courts, are under an obligation to eliminate that breach. The 
precise obligations which flow from this are not clear and will need to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis. It is important to note, however, that in 
Kadi the Court of Justice expressly held that Article 351 TFEU (ex Article 
307 EC) cannot 
be understood to authorise any derogation from the principles of liberty, democ-
racy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in Article 
6(1) EU …128 
and 
may in no circumstances permit any challenge to the principles that form part of 
the very foundations of the Community legal order, one of which is the protection 
of fundamental rights...129 
The peremptory language used by the Court of Justice suggests that Article 
351 TFEU does not preclude judicial review on grounds of compatibility 
127 Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925; Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress 
Zeitungsverlags- und Vertreibs GmbH v Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689; Case C-71/02 
Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH v Troostwijk GmbH [2004] ECR I-3025.
128 Kadi, above n 1, para 303.
129 Ibid, para 304. 
 Economic Sanctions, Procedural Rights and Judicial Scrutiny 489
with EU rights of a national measure which has been adopted to give effect 
to a UNSC resolution but which falls within the scope of EU law. A number 
of concomitant issues arise in this context. Could it be said, for example, that 
the standard of scrutiny of such a national measure would be lower than that 
applicable to determine the compatibility of a measure adopted by the EU 
institutions? It is not clear why the answer to this question should be in the 
affirmative. 
V. CONCLUSION
There is a striking degree of convergence among courts in the EU, the UK 
and beyond to the effect that responses to emergencies which make for 
serious intrusions on fundamental rights should be channelled through con-
stitutional procedures and institutional practices which are most respect-
ful of democracy, accountability and the rights of the individual. The EU 
legal system is committed to a substantive version of the rule of law, while 
English law, bred in the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, subscribes 
to a formal version. Despite the fact that the two systems commence from 
different points of principle, the difference in judicial outcomes is less clear. 
English courts have proved skilful in applying the principle of legality with 
an asphyxiating effect for the executive.
Neither Kadi nor the judgment in Jabar Ahmed addresses some funda-
mental problems which may result from the interaction between national 
law, UN obligations and EU law. In particular, it is not clear whether, in 
the event of a conflict between obligations flowing from EU law and obli-
gations flowing from the UN Charter, national courts will give precedence 
to the former or to the latter. Although the Court of Justice did not have 
to confront the issue directly in Kadi, as a matter of EU law, the answer 
appears clear: national courts should give effect to EU law obligations. 
This solution is dictated by the principle of primacy and the fact that the 
Court of Justice treats EU and national law as two tiers of the same legal 
system which can be viewed as part of domestic law for the purposes of 
Article 103 of the UN Charter. Any other solution would contradict the 
solutions reached by the Court of Justice. If, under the principle of primacy 
of EU law, the latter takes precedence over the national constitutions, why 
should it not take precedence over obligations emanating from member-
ship of the UN? After all, those obligations can be given effect only in 
accordance with the national constitutions and, from the point of view of 
EU law, are part of them and thus subordinate to EU law. Whether such 
strict EU law orthodoxy would be accepted by the national courts remains 
to be seen. Too strict an orthodoxy carries with it a higher risk of rebellion. 
The bottom line is that we are faced again with the problem of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, to which there is no conclusive answer. Is it national courts or 
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the Court of Justice which have ultimate authority to determine the scope 
of application of EU law? In English law, the parameters are firmly set 
by the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy. It will thus be a question of 
ascertaining what the judiciary perceives to be the true wishes of the UK 
Parliament as to the priority between EU and UN obligations in any given 
context.
